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INTRODUCTION

A. Issue
You have asked that we assist the PILPG High Level Working Group (PILPG) on various
piracy issues to provide assistance to the Kenya Piracy Court and other cooperating state
courts and to help to lay the groundwork for a Security Council-created Regional Piracy
Court.1
We have been asked to provide our opinion with respect to the following question:
Under International Law, should states look to the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), the Maritime Terrorism Convention (SUA), or customary
international law to best address modern acts of piracy? To the extent that both
Conventions are applicable, what are the differences in the substantive law and
procedures?

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION

B. Summary of Conclusion
UNCLOS provides authority for Kenya to prosecute alleged pirates, but its grant of
authority has severe limitations. Under UNCLOS, the act of piracy must occur on the
high seas and it must involve two ships. In addition, an argument can be made that the
country seeking to exercise jurisdiction ought to be the state seizing the suspects.
However, a permissive grant of jurisdiction resulting from use of the word ‘may’ in
article 105, read together with UNCLOS article 100, arguably creates a broader

1

Memorandum to Angela Vigil, Baker & McKenzie, from Brett Ashley Edwards, PILPG dated March 7,
2011.
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prosecutorial authority for states seeking to prosecute those seized outside of their
jurisdiction.
The SUA Convention offers a broader grant of authority than UNCLOS in several
respects. First, it does not require the involvement of two ships, and it is not restricted to
acts on the high seas because it includes acts occurring where a ship is navigating to or
from the territorial sea of a single state. Second, it offers broad prosecutorial jurisdiction
to states. The Convention applies to offenders found in a state’s territory. As a result, the
SUA Convention can be invoked to prosecute pirates and does not have the limitations
that UNCLOS presents.
Customary international law offers the broadest grant of authority. Under customary
international law, states have “universal jurisdiction” to prosecute pirates. This is based
on the doctrine that pirates are universally condemned as enemies of all mankind.
Because pirates act without pretense of a state’s authority, any nation has the right to
arrest and prosecute pirates in its domestic courts, provided that the accused is under the
personal jurisdiction of the court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Kenya is the southern neighbor of Somalia. Mombasa, one of Kenya’s largest cities, is a
major port serving the international shipping industry. Consequently, the rising incidence
of ship hijackings off of Somalia’s coast has plagued maritime traffic and affected the
port’s operations. In April 2010, Kenya’s foreign minister announced that Kenya would
not accept any additional Somali pirate cases. This led to the United Nations’ effort to
urge other nations to provide assistance to Kenya to erect a high security courtroom,
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resulting in international donations totalling $9.3 million to fund piracy trials. On June
24, 2010, Kenya announced that it was opening a fast-track piracy court in Mombasa, a
move well-received by the international community.2
However, on November 9, 2010, the High Court of Mombasa ruled that Kenya did not
have jurisdiction outside its national waters, resulting in the release of nine suspected
Somali pirates at the conclusion of their trial.3 The basis for the ruling was the adoption
of a penal code measure that limited Kenya’s jurisdiction over piracy in its territorial
waters.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea4 (“UNCLOS”) provides authority
for Kenya to prosecute alleged pirates. However, its grant of authority has severe
limitations. Under UNCLOS, the act of piracy must occur on the high seas, the act of
piracy must be one involving two ships, and arguably Kenya should be the state seizing
the suspects.

2

“Kenya opens fast-track piracy court in Mombasa”, BBC News (24 June 2010), online: BBC Online
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10401413> and Jeffrey Gettleman, “The West Turns to Kenya as Piracy
Criminal Court”, New York Times (23 April 2009), online: New York Times
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/world/africa/24kenya.html>.
3
Julia Zebley, “Kenya court rules no jurisdiction over international piracy cases” Jurist (9 November 2010)
online: Jurist Legal News and Research Services <http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/11/kenya-court-rulesno-jurisdiction-over-international-piracy-cases.php>.
4
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
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UNCLOS is a Convention between states (nations). As of November 15, 2010, 161
states had ratified the Convention.5 Although the United States has not ratified
UNCLOS, it is a party to the Convention on the High Seas. 6 Of note, important
provisions including the definition of piracy, the duty to cooperate to repress piracy, and
the jurisdiction of the state carrying out the seizure to prosecute pirates originally appear
in the Convention on the High Seas7 and were thereafter included verbatim in UNCLOS.
Furthermore, it is generally accepted that UNCLOS has been codified as part of
customary international law.8 Kenya ratified UNCLOS on March 2, 1989.9
UNCLOS defines the rights and responsibilities of states in their use of the world’s
oceans. UNCLOS gives states jurisdiction over piracy in the high seas, exclusive
economic zones of costal states and any place beyond the jurisdiction of any state. It
allows, and indeed encourages, states-parties to arrest individuals participating in piracy
on the high seas out of the jurisdiction of any state.

5

Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations
“Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related
Agreements as at 15 November 2010” online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm>. These states
include China (1996), Germany (1994), the United Kingdom (1997), Canada (2003) and Russia (1997).
6
See United Nations, “Convention on the High Seas: Status as of 13-05-2011”, online: United Nations
Treaty Collections
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=XXI2&chapter=21&lang=en#Participants>. “[T]he definition of piracy jure gentium in Article 15 of the
[CHS], based as it was on the work of the International Law Commission, and now confirmed and repeated
word for word in the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, must be regarded as having great authority.”
Oppenheim, Vol. I, pp. 746-747, cited in D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed.
(London : Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) at 432.
7
Convention of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, arts. 14, 15, 19.
8
R. Chuck Mason, “Piracy: A Legal Definition” (2010), online: Congressional Research Service
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41455.pdf>.
9
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations
“Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related
Agreements as at 15 November 2010” online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm>.
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Article 100 of UNCLOS sets forth a duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy:10
All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy
on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.

Article 101 defines piracy as follows:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b).11

In addition to the duty to cooperate, Article 105 addresses seizures and arrests and gives
states which carried out the seizure the authority to prosecute.
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every
State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and
under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on
board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the
penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with
regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting
in good faith.12

10

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, art. 100; this
provision is adopted from art. 14 of the Convention of the High Seas, 29 April 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
11
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, art. 101;
adopted from Article 15 of the Convention of the High Seas.
12
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, art. 105. This
provision is adopted from Article 19 of the Convention of the High Seas, 29 April 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
450 U.N.T.S. 82.
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Only warships or other clearly marked government ships or aircrafts may be used in the
seizure of pirate vessels.13
Pursuant to Article 58, the duties and rights of all States parties respecting piracy apply to
the exclusive economic zones of costal states.
However, there are three severe limitations under UNCLOS. First, the definition of
piracy extends only to attacks on ships on the high seas. Many piratical acts occur in
territorial or coastal waters. The second is that while states have authority to prosecute
suspected pirates where they have carried out the seizure, UNCLOS does not provide
prosecutorial authority to said states against suspects seized by third parties. Also, the
seizure must be carried out by a warship or other clearly marked government ship or
aircraft. Third, the definition requires the involvement of two ships and does not embrace
a piratical act from a raft or an attack from dockside.
In summary, UNCLOS may give Kenya or cooperating states the jurisdiction to
adjudicate piracy suspects that have been seized by that state’s or another state’s
authorities, where the seizure occurred on the high seas by a clearly marked government
ship or aircraft, and two ships were involved. It has been raised in defence that UNCLOS
does not provide any authority to prosecute suspected pirates captured by other states and
turned over to Kenyan or cooperating authorities.

13

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, art. 107.
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B. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (SUA)
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation14 (SUA) offers an alternative basis for prosecuting piracy, though it
was not designed for that specific purpose.
Following the 1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro,15 the International Maritime
Organization (IMO)16 was invited to prepare a convention on appropriate measures to
deal with the threat of terrorism aboard and against ships. The result was the SUA, which
today has 157 state parties.17
Terrorists and pirates have different goals. Pirates usually are seeking ransom or stealing
the cargo or, perhaps, even the ship. It is a business carried on in view of a profit.
Terrorists are engaged in acts against a state or population. The SUA was designed to
address acts of terrorism. However, its broad grant of authority has been construed to
authorize the prosecution of pirates.
The offences under the SUA are enumerated under Article 3, which states:
Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally:
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof.

14

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1678
U.N.T.S. 221, 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988).
15
The Achille Lauro was a cruise ship hijacked by the Palestinian Liberation Army. By hijacking the ship,
and taking the crew and passengers hostage, the PLA sought to coerce the release of Palestinian prisoners
held by Israel. One passenger, Leon Kling-Hoffer, a wheelchair-bound German tourist, was murdered and
tossed overboard during the ordeal. See Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, [1989] 490 U.S. 495.
16
See “Introduction to IMO”, International Maritime Organization online : <www.imo.org>. The IMO is
the United Nations’ specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping, and the
prevention of marine pollution by ships.
17
International Maritime Organization “Status of Conventions”, online:
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Summary%20of%20Status.xls.
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(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is
likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship
(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or its cargo which is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or
substance which is likely to destroy the ship, or cause damage to that ship or its
cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously
interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of a ship
(f) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering
the safe navigation of a ship
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the
attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f).

The SUA Convention offers a broader grant of authority than UNCLOS in several
respects. It does not require the involvement of two ships, and it is not restricted to acts
on the high seas because it includes acts occurring where a ship is navigating to or from
the territorial sea of a single state.18 It also extends prosecutorial jurisdiction beyond the
state that makes the seizure. The Convention applies to offenders found in a territory of a
state-party.19
Furthermore, there is a positive obligation in Article 12 for state parties to assist each
other with criminal proceedings relating to the offences in Article 3 of the SUA.
The SUA Convention grants states the power to prosecute individuals charged with
piracy. This authority is exemplified by the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th
Circuit decision, United States v. Shi.20 The Court relied extensively on the SUA
Convention to afford the U.S. government jurisdiction to prosecute a foreign national
18

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1678
U.N.T.S. 221, 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988), art. 4.
19
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1678
U.N.T.S. 221, 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988), art. 6.
20
United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2008).
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who seized control of a ship and fatally stabbed members of its crew in 2002. The
accused was arrested and indicted for violating 28 U.S.C. § 2280, which proscribes
certain acts of violence that endanger maritime navigation. This statute also codifies the
United States’ obligations under the SUA Convention.
Following his conviction, Shi appealed and challenged the constitutionality of the U.S.
statute. The 9th Circuit held the provision to be constitutional on the basis that it was a
valid exercise of the “define and punish” power granted to Congress under Article I,
Section 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution. The Court also held the provision to be a valid
exercise of Congress’ power under the Constitution’s “necessary and proper” clause.21
Moreover, the judgment went beyond simply relying on the SUA and 28 U.S.C. § 2280
by holding that the district court had “universal jurisdiction”:
Universal jurisdiction is based on the premise that offenses against all states may
be punished by any state where the offender is found….Accordingly, it allows a
state to claim jurisdiction over such an offender even if the offender’s acts
occurred outside its boundaries and even if the offender has no connection to the
state.22

The court concluded that the acts committed by Shi constituted piracy. The court held
that, “[a] pirate can be tried by any state,” citing United States v. Smith23 and quoting Sir
Edward Coke, who argued that a pirate is the enemy of the human race.24

C. Customary International Law
As United States v. Shi suggests, customary international law offers the broadest grant of
authority for the prosecution of individuals accused of piracy.

21

U.S. Const. art. I, §. 8, cls. 10 and 18.
United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2008) at 722-23.
23
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820).
24
The Avalon Project, Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England – Book the Fourth – Chapter
the Fifth: Of Offences Against the Law of Nations, online: Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk4ch5.asp>.
22
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The Supreme Court of the United States discussed the scope of the SUA Convention and
customary international law in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.25 The Court held that AlvarezMachain could not sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) or the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) to recover damages resulting from his abduction in Mexico by Sosa.26
Justice Souter explained that the FTCA exception for claims “[a]rising in a foreign
country” barred the action because the abduction occurred in Mexico. The Court rejected
the “headquarters doctrine” – the rationale that where the planning for the abduction
occurred in the United States, there was an illegal act in the U.S. that could trigger the
application of the FTCA.
With regard to the ATS claim, the Court held that the statute is only jurisdictional: “[I]t
does no more than vest federal courts with jurisdiction neither creating nor authorizing
the courts to recognize any particular right of action.”27 In addressing the issue of
whether there was a right of action that Alvarez-Machain could invoke, the Court
explained the scope of the jurisdiction granted under the ATS:
[W]e think at the time of enactment that jurisdiction enabled federal courts to
hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and
recognized at common law.28

The Court supported this reasoning by expounding upon the law of nations, paying
particular reference to what the Founders meant when they granted Congress the power
“[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences

25

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
Alvarez had been indicted for his alleged role in the torture and murder of Drug Enforcement Agency
(D.E.A.) agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar in 1985. In 1990, Alvarez was indicted in California. When
efforts to extradite him were fruitless, the D.E.A. helped plan his abduction. Alvarez was tried in 1992, and
acquitted. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) at 697-98.
27
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) at 712.
28
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) at 712.
26
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against the Law of Nations.”29 Citing Blackstone, the Court explained that the Founders
would have understood the “law of nations” to include three specific offenses that had
been addressed by the criminal law of England: violation of safe conducts, infringement
of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. Therefore, claims arising from such offences
would have been cognizable under the ATS. Because Alvarez-Machain’s claim was
different, he did not have a cognizable ATS claim.
A highly relevant case to consider with regard to how the customary law applies to
pirates is United States v. Hasan. The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
denied a motion to dismiss an indictment for piracy holding that a seizure attempt not
resulting in a robbery was still piracy. “Universal jurisdiction” could then be invoked.30
The Court addressed two issues when considering the motion to dismiss. As to its
jurisdiction, the Court relied on the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, noting that any
nation has the right to arrest and prosecute pirates in domestic courts as they are “enemies
of all mankind”.
With regard to whether an attack on a vessel that does not result in an actual taking of
property constitutes piracy, the court was confronted with the decision in United States v.
Smith, in which the Supreme Court stated that piracy as defined by the law of nations was

29

U.S. Const. art. I, §. 8, cl. 10.
The defendants in the case stood accused of attacking a vessel assumed to be a merchant ship, which
turned out to be the USS Nicholas, an American frigate. The defendants were pursued, captured, and
brought to stand trial for piracy in the U.S. – United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642 (2010). It is
worth noting that a similar case out of the Eastern District of Virginia, United States v. Said, reached a
different conclusion at trial regarding a motion to dismiss a piracy indictment. For additional commentary
regarding the distinctions between the Hasan and Said rulings see R. Chuck Mason, “Piracy: A Legal
Definition” (2010), online: Congressional Research Service <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R41455.pdf> at 6-7.
30
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“robbery upon the sea”.31 However, the court observed that it was not clear whether that
definition was used because the facts in that case warranted it or whether it was intended
to limit piracy to robberies. In any event, the court held that the law of nations was to be
assessed at the time of the violation and not frozen in time.
The Court also considered the definition of piracy articulated in UNCLOS and the
Convention on the High Seas32 as evidence of customary international law. This review
persuaded the Court to rule that acts of violence (i.e., attempts) were included in the
customary international law of piracy.
Furthermore, the Court in Hasan discussed a decision in a criminal case prosecuted in
Kenya in 2009 where Somali suspects were captured by the U.S. Navy on the high seas
and brought to Kenya.33 The Kenyan court of first instance relied on the definition of
piracy in UNCLOS. On appeal, the Kenyan High Court affirmed the ruling, but went
further in holding that even if the Convention had not been ratified, the Magistrate was
bound to apply the relevant international norms.34

CONCLUSION
This analysis concludes that to best address modern acts of piracy the Kenya Piracy Court
and/or cooperating states can rely on the SUA and the Convention of the High Seas as

31

United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820) at 162.
As of 9 February 2010, 63 states are listed as parties to the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. See
Centre for International Law, 1958 Convention on the High Seas, online: National University of Singapore
<http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1958/1958-convention-on-the-high-seas/>. The United States is party to the
Convention. See Katie Smith Matison, “The Big Business of Maritime Piracy and the Modern Corsair:
Dead Men Tell No Tales”, online: (2010) Journal of Transportation Law, Logistics and Policy at p. 376
<http://www.lanepowell.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Matison_JTLP_2.pdf>.
33
Ahmed v Republic, Crim. App. Nos. 198, 199, 201, 203, 204, 205, 207 & 207 of 2008 (H.C.K. 12 May
2009) cited in United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642 (2010) at 618.
34
Ahmed at 10-11 cited in United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642 (2010) at 618.
32
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main sources to prosecute pirates. Both Conventions can be supported by customary
international law, but we have a concern that basing authority solely on customary
international law may cause some courts in certain jurisdictions to question the extent to
which customary international law applies.
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